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much more than tariffs or transports costs can explain. We therefore advocate investi-
gation of other sources of resistance, despite the greater difficult involved in measuring
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emerges. A legacy of historical isolation and conflict forged a world economy in which
neither tastes nor information are homogeneously distributed. Cultural difference and
inadequate information manifest themselves most strongly at national borders and over
distance.
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1. Introduction
The world is not borderless, flat, small, or even shrinking. Put another way,
the new world economy announced on the covers of books in airport non-
fiction sections bears little resemblance to the real world economy.1 Academic
economists tend to approach such books with considerable scepticism, so one
might question the need to write an academic paper debunking them. Our aim
here is first to explain how trade data lead us to the conclusion that the gap
between reality and full globalization is very wide and not likely to be closed
under current trends. Thenwewill explorewhy the gap remains sowide despite the
advent of policies and technologies that were, with some justification, expected
to foster globalization.
We see evidence suggesting that the absence of globalization cannot be reduced
to conventional explanations, such as tariffs and freight costs. Instead, we argue
that what separates us can be broadly thought of as ‘isolation legacy’ effects: high
costs of mobility and trade in the past generate persistent sources of bilateral
resistance to trade in the present. We want to admit up front that the collage of
evidence we present is incomplete and often admits of alternative explanations
to the ones we propose. We see this as a feature, not a bug, of this paper because
it allows us to use this as an opportunity to promote a research agenda.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section shows graphically that, relative
to a full globalization ideal, there is currently much too little trade and what
trade there is occurs over too short distances. The following section introduces
the modern gravity equation as a tool for determining the principal forms of
resistance to globalization. We inspect distance and border effects and show that
both are too large to be explained by observed freight and tariff rates. Making
an analogy with astrophysics, we quantify the importance of ‘dark’ distance- and
border-related costs that are difficult to observe but needed to explain the ‘missing
trade’ (a term coined by Trefler 1995). The final section before concluding then
delves into four sources of resistance that we see as promising explanations:
spatial decay of information, localized tastes, colonial legacies, and long-run
impacts of conflict.
2. The globalization gap
There are a many different ways to reach the conclusion that globalization is
a fundamental and inexorable trend. Much of the evidence is anecdotal, for
example, the ubiquity of Starbucks or sushi. For thosemore dataminded, Exhibit
A is often a plot such as the one shown in figure 1(a). It shows world imports
1 As examples of the titles we have in mind, see Cairncross’s The Death of Distance, Ohmae’s The
Borderless World, and, most prominently, Friedman’s The World is Flat.
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FIGURE 1 Rising openness has not closed the globalization gap
of both goods and services divided by world GDP.2 Much of the volatility in
the openness derives from oil price variations. When we remove the oil trade,
the trend towards greater openness shows little variation other than the ‘trade
collapse’ of 2008–2009.
How open should we expect the world to be? Is 30% openness in 2011 a high
number or a low number? To answer this we follow Helpman (1987) in con-
structing a benchmark based on an idealized notion of a world with no trade
impediments. If foreign products were just as accessible and desirable as domestic
ones, then under complete specialization each country would consume its expen-
diture share of every other country’s production. When we use the notation of
Eaton andKortum (2002), bilateral imports of country n from country i areXni =
(Xn/Xw)Xi. World imports are therefore
∑
n
∑
i =n Xni =
∑
n(Xn/Xw)(Xw − Xn).
Dividing by world expenditure, Xw, results in a simple formula for the world
import to expenditure ratio:
Benchmark =
∑
n
Xn
Xw
−
∑
n
(
Xn
Xw
)2
= 1 −H. (1)
Since H is the Herfindahl index of expenditure concentration, Helpman (1987)
refers to 1 −H as a dispersion index for the world economy. As total expenditure
is not a conventional component of national accounts, GDP is used as the proxy
for Xn. Over time, the benchmark for complete globalization has been rising,
going from 77% in 1960 to 92% in 2011. One reason is that new countries
have come into existence, often by splitting up prior nations. This mechanically
leads to more measured international trade even if the producers and consumers
have not changed. Similarly, rising Asian GDP shares lower H, which raises
the benchmark. The entire rise in openness that has occurred over the last half-
century, an 18 percentage point increase from 12% in 1960 to 30% in 2011, is
2 Openness is sometimes defined as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP, but this
makes little sense when calculated at the world level.
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FIGURE 2 Far from the flat-world ideal
less than one-third of the gap that remains at the end of the data (62 percentage
points).
Figure 2 provides a different way to illustrate the gap between current trade
patterns and those that would prevail under complete globalization. Rather than
consider the binary choice between buying at home and buying abroad, it exam-
ines the distribution of international trade across distances. The CDF of distance
conveys some interesting facts: About 60% of trade moves less than 5000 km.
More than 80% of trade occurs over distances less than 10,000 km. But given
that many large economies are located near each other, we require a standard
against which to judge these shares.
We devise a benchmark by generating hypothetical trade flows at each distance
in which each country n consumes its GDP share of each other country’s GDP:
X∗ni = (Xn/Xw)Xi. The dashed black line shows the distribution of distances that
would prevail under this distance neutral benchmark. Now less than 20% of
traded goods would travel less than 5000km under full globalization. Solid and
dashed lines in figure 2 show the actual and flat-world distributions based on
1950 trade and GDP patterns, respectively. In contrast to the prediction that
technology would be ‘flattening,’ goods in 1950 not only travelled further than
in 2000, they were closer to the benchmark.
The evidence presented in figures 1 and 2 suggests that the current level of
trade is far from the globalization ideal. In most economic models that would
suggest the possibility that considerable future gains from further integration are
potentially available. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) provide a
simple formula we can use for a back-of-the-envelope calculation of these welfare
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changes.3 The welfare in some hypothetical trade cost regime,W ′ relative to the
current welfare,W , is given by
W ′i /Wi =
(
π ′ii/πii
)1/
,
where  < 0 is the elasticity of imports with respect to trade costs and πii is
the share of expenditures on all goods that are sourced domestically. We follow
Melitz and Redding (2013) in using  = −4.25. For Canada πii is about 0.75.4
Two interesting values of π ′ii are 1 (autarky) and 0.02 (Canada’s approximate
share of world production).5 Applying the formula to both π ′ii cases yields
 losses from autarky: −7% ((1/0.75)(−1/4.25) = 0.93)
 potential gains from complete globalization: 135% ((0.02/0.75)(−1/4.25) = 2.35)6
These numbers tell us that, in standard models, the gains from complete eco-
nomic integration dwarf the losses from reverting to autarky. They motivate a
strong public policy interest in understanding the forces that impeded globaliza-
tion, but we should not take them too seriously. First, the full globalization ideal
involves a world without mountain ranges, oceans, or even time zones. It speaks
a single language, uses a single currency, and has a complete customs union. And
the people living in that world share a common set of tastes. Recognizing some
of these features as constraints on feasible integration, the π ′ii of 0.02 may be
seen as too low even to be justified as a thought experiment. A second concern is
that some of the sources of resistance to globalization may invalidate the welfare
formula itself, a point we will return to later when we discuss those forces.
3. Gravity in a nutshell
Graphing trade propensities and the distribution of trading distances relative
to a benchmark is a powerful way to falsify the claim that we are close to full
globalization. But these graphs do not provide estimates of the magnitude of
the distance effect on trade. Furthermore, they cannot tell us which other forces
impede globalization, controlling for distance. For these purposes we need an
equation expressing bilateral trade as a function of its chief impediments and
facilitators. That equation, generally credited to Tinbergen (1962), is the gravity
equation.
3 It is valid under a variety of model structures so long as the economy has a fairly simple
structure and some functional forms are valid approximations.
4 CANSIM table 386-0003 shows international imports are $384bn. Dividing by total demand,
$1,502bn yields 1 − π = 0.255.
5 Canada’s 2009 share of world GDP in PPP was 1.85%.
6 Doubling the trade elasticity to 8.5, the upper bound of the reliable estimates, lowers the
potential gain to (0.02/0.75)(−1/8.5) = 1.53, that is, a 53% welfare improvement.
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What we call the Naive form of the gravity equation is expressed as
Xni = GY
a
i Y
b
n
Dcni
, (2)
whereYi andYn are exporter and importer GDPs,Dni is distance from i to n, and
G is a constant. In most estimations a ≈ b ≈ c ≈ 1 such that we obtain a very
simple law-like relationship:
Gravity Law:Holding constant the product of two countries’ sizes, their bilateral trade
will, on average, be inversely proportional to the distance between them.
3.1. A better answer to Ulam’s challenge
Mathematician Stanislaw Ulam (inventor of the Monte-Carlo method) chal-
lenged Paul Samuelson to ‘name me one proposition in all of the social sciences
which is both true and non-trivial.’ Samuelson (later) came up with an answer:
comparative advantage. ‘That it is logically true need not be argued before a
mathematician; that it is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and
intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or
to believe it after it was explained to them.’ Granting Samuelson the non-trivial
part, Ulam probably did not mean a logical or mathematical truth, since social
science is supposed to make empirically true claims. A more compelling response
to Ulam would be the Gravity Law.
Wewill use the same argument as Samuelson to back the assertion that gravity
is ‘not trivial’:Many intelligent commentators on the world economy have denied
gravity in oneway or another. First, there are thewidely read and discussed books
by respected journalists, including a former editor of The Economist (The Death
of Distance) and weekly columnist for the New York Times (The World Is Flat).
Journalists may be more inclined to believe in globalization as a reality, rather
than an ideal, because they often base their conclusions on specific examples.7
Even a former director general of the World Trade Organization embraced the
anti-gravity view:
I just want to mention several key features that will define this new borderless econ-
omy: One is its increasing indifference to geography, time and borders. Trade used
to be shaped by the realities of geography as one element in a nation’s compara-
tive advantage. Now, in important sectors, trade will be shaped by the absence of
geography. (Renato Ruggiero 1997; italics in original)
Distance denial has been going on for a long time. George Orwell complained
in 1944:
7 Ghemawat (2011) notes that: ‘Something other than data must account for the success of The
World Is Flat, since its 450-plus pages contain not a single table, chart, or footnote to back its
pronouncements.’
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Reading recently a batch of rather shallowly optimistic ‘progressive’ books, I was
struck by the automatic way in which people go on repeating certain phrases which
were fashionable before 1914. Two great favourites are ‘the abolition of distance’
and ‘the disappearance of frontiers.’
While there are few trade economists now who are unaware that distance im-
pedes bilateral trade, thirty years after Tinbergen’s gravity estimations, Bhagwati
(1993), one of the most prominent trade economists of the time, sought to cast
doubt on the notion that there were ‘natural’ free trade agreements based on
geographic proximity:
If I had access to captive research assistance and funds, I could examine whether,
for all conceivable combinations of countries and distances among them, and for
several different time periods, the premise [that proximity increases trade] is valid.
I do not, so I must rely on casual empiricism and a priori arguments . . . Borders
[such as the one between Pakistan and India] can breed hostility and undermine
trade, just as alliances between distant countries with shared causes can promote
trade . . . [The premise that distance reduces trade] does not have a firm empirical
or conceptual basis.
Bhagwati was certainly onto something important in discussing the role of
hostilities and alliances – as we will discuss later – but he seems unaware that
these are the exceptions: the norm is for trade to decline with distance.
Having thus established that the Gravity Law is not obvious or trivial, we now
turn to establishing that it is true.
3.2. Fifty years of estimating gravity
Our first argument is an appeal to authority. In their Handbook of International
Economics chapter, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) assert that gravity models
‘have produced some of the clearest and most robust findings in economics.’ To
make an evidence-based case, our first exhibit is figure 3, inspired by a similar
figure in Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), which itself echoed a plot Isard and Peck
(1954) published 40 years earlier.
Panel (a) shows France’s imports in 2006 divided by the GDP of the exporter
for all origins. The distance elasticity estimated over all origins, −0.89, is close
to the −1 implied by the Gravity Law. As a demonstration of law-like behaviour,
this figure has a serious drawback: with an R2 of just 20%, the fit is not very
impressive. There are clearly many more determinants of bilateral trade than
just GDP and distance. Yet it does not seem appropriate to insist that social
behaviour follow laws that are as parsimonious as those in the physical sciences.
TheGravity Law should be seen as a partial elasticity holdingmany confounding
factors constant.
In that spirit, we zoom in on France’s trade with other members of the EU
and OECD. The EU grouping neutralizes trade policy and standardizes some
institutions. The OECD group is believed to have higher data quality and also
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FIGURE 3 France’s 2006 imports follow the gravity law
higher per capita income. Panel (b) of figure 3 shows that the restricted sample
adheres more closely to the Gravity Law, with distance explaining 70% of the
variation in the import to partner GDP ratio. The estimated distance elasticity
rounds to −1.00. To the extent this figure is representative of broader samples,
we may fairly claim to have answered Ulam’s challenge with a non-trivial yet
demonstrably true empirical proposition from the social sciences.
The graphical approach taken in figure 3 has the great advantage of trans-
parency: there is no econometric layer between the data and the reader. Never-
theless, the discussion of the figures above reveals the limitations of the graphical
approach. We have considered only one importer in one year and we have no
controls (except for dividing by partner GDPs). To find partial elasticities that
are representative of a broad sample it is therefore essential to run regressions.
The solid black line in figure 4 describes the distribution of 1835 estimates of
the distance effect,−∂ lnXni/∂ lnDni, using data assembled for the meta-analysis
reported in Head and Mayer (2013). The solid and dashed vertical lines denote
the values of the median and mean estimates, respectively. Coincidentally, the
median figure is −0.89, the same as the one estimated for France in figure 3(a).
The data sets, sample periods, and econometric methods for these estimates vary
considerably. Yet the central tendency of the estimates around −1 is undeniable.
An important caveat about these estimates is that the vast majority of them
are based on the naive form of the gravity equation (augmented with numerous
controls). The highly influential work of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
forced trade economists to recognize that, while theories had been derived to
justify the naive gravity equation, none of those theories actually predicts the
functional form in equation (2). A range of theoretical underpinnings all point
to the need to revise our view of the appropriate way to think of country size.
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FIGURE 4 The distribution of 1835 estimates of distance effects
A country’s total output needs to be discounted by the opportunities it has
for exporting that output and, similarly, a country’s total expenditure should be
discounted by the opportunities it has to source from alternative suppliers. Speci-
fications incorporating these adjustments, following directly from the equilibrium
conditions in the models are called ‘structural gravity.’
Structural gravity comprises the following system of equations
Xni = SiMnrni , where Si = Yi/i, and Mn = Xn/n
n =
∑

Y
rn
and i =
∑

X
ri
. (3)
In these equations rni denotes bilateral resistance and−1 and−1 aremultilateral
resistance terms.8
Resistance can be specified in various ways. The way that links best to the
bulk of empirical work is as the product of border (β) and distance (D) ef-
fects rni = βniDδni. Border effects can be thought of as the collective effect of
all the increases in trade impediments that typically occur when goods cross
an international border. In practice, gravity estimations often control for many
of those effects – free trade, common currency, common language, and legal
8 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for the initial derivation and Head and Mayer (2013) for
a list of all models that are compatible with this formulation.
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system – since certain facets of border costs are selectively lower for some bi-
lateral pairs. In those regressions, the border effect may be estimated as the
residual influence of borders. A second way to think of resistance, which ties
more closely to theory and welfare is rni = τ−ni . In this specification τ − 1 is
the ad valorem equivalent of all trade costs and  is the trade cost elasticity
(∂ lnXni/∂ ln τni).
The structural gravity equation can be estimated in a variety of ways, but by
far the easiest is with fixed effects for each exporter-year and importer-year. Head
and Mayer (2013) describe other methods and pit them against each other in a
Monte Carlo study. At the risk of oversimplifying the results, the two-way fixed
effects method emerges as the clear winner.9 The intuitive reason why country-
level fixed effects are important for estimating bilateral effects (such as distance
and borders) is that equation (3) reveals that the Si and Mn terms are functions
of all the bilateral sources of resistance.
The grey line in figure 4 shows the distribution of the 328 estimates that
we classified as structural (because they use one of the approved methods for
dealing with multilateral resistance, usually two-way fixed effects). The central
tendencies (dashed mean lines and solid median lines) are not so different, but
the distributions have notably different shapes, the structural mean being lower
than the median, which is less than the mode.
What can we conclude from these distributions? First we see the ‘on average’
part of the Gravity Law is doing double duty. Firstly, it is invoking a conditional
expectation (holding other variables constant). Secondly, the inverse proportion-
ality is itself only an average elasticity. Disdier and Head (2010) show that there
is too much variation in the estimated distance effect to be derived simply from
sampling error.An important unresolved question iswhether all this variation de-
rives from estimation method differences or true parameter heterogeneity. While
the distinction between naive and structural estimates points to some of the het-
erogeneity coming frommethod, the remaining variance of estimates inside each
method suggests that it cannot be the whole story.
3.3. Decomposing the distance effect
To understand why the distance effect might vary, we decompose it into the
product of two more fundamental elasticities:
δ ≡ ∂ ln rni
∂ lnDni
= − ∂ln Trade
∂ln Trade costs
∂ln Trade costs
∂ln Distance
= −ρ. (4)
9 Other methods, such as iterative estimation of equation (3) and various approaches that use
ratios or subtract off means to remove the Si andMn terms, gave equivalent results under full
samples but poor results with missing data.
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The first factor, , is a structural parameter in most models.10 In models such as
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it is one minus the elasticity of substitution
between goods from different countries; that is,  = 1 − σ . In the Ricardian
model of Eaton and Kortum (2002)  = −θ , where θ is the parameter governing
the dispersionof labour requirements across goods and countries. In trademodels
featuring firm-level heterogeneity, such as Chaney (2008),  = −θ as well, but
now θ is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution assumed to govern
performance differences between firms. The second factor, ρ, measures the effect
of distance on the cost of delivery. In models featuring full pass-through of costs
into prices, it is also a measure of the change in delivered prices as distance rises.
For the absolute value of the trade elasticity to take the unit value of the
Gravity Law, it would have to be the case that −ρ = 1. How plausible is that?
Reviewing the set of elasticity estimates available when they were writing, An-
derson and van Wincoop (2004) conclude that σ ‘is likely to be in the range of
five to ten,’ implying  between −4 and −9. Conventional wisdom appears to
have shifted towards the smallest (absolute) elasticities in this range. For example,
Eaton and Kortum (2012) use  = −4 in their quantification of the Ricardian
model, considering it to be ‘in line with’ several studies. Head and Mayer (2013)
summarize all the available estimates and find  = −5. This is the median of
435 estimates identified based on variation in trade in response to variation in
tariff or freight costs. Smaller estimates ( ≈ −3) result when other identification
approaches are included.
Estimates of ρ are relatively rare. If freight and insurance are the main com-
ponents of trade costs then ρ can be measured in three different ways. The first
two methods involve regressing the log of the ratio of CIF to FOB trade flows
on log distance.11 This is because CIF is the sum of FOB and transport costs;
thus, CIF/FOB equals one plus the ad valorem freight and insurance rate. A first
version of this approach obtains that CIF and FOB values come from different
declarations, namely, the exporter’s report of the FOB value and the importer’s
report of the CIF value. The first estimate of ρ that we know of appears in
Geraci and Prewo (1977), who use this method on an OECD sample and esti-
mate ρˆ = 0.07. More recently, Lima˜o and Venables (2001) use the same type of
data but with a much larger sample to estimate ρˆ = 0.25 (without controls). The
difference arisesmainly becauseLima˜o andVenables code τ = 50 (the highest ob-
served CIF/FOB ratio in their sample) for the 22% of the sample where bilateral
10 We know of three exceptions. First, the Novy (2013) translog bilateral trade equation implies a
non-constant trade elasticity. Second, Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2013) find that log-normal
firm-level heterogeneity (instead of the usual Pareto assumption) implies a trade elasticity that
decreases with expected trade. A variable trade elasticity also arises in Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008) because of upper truncation of a Pareto productivity distribution.
11 CIF stands for ‘cost, insurance and freight’ and FOB stands for ‘free on board.’ The FOB value
sums the value at the factory gate with the costs of transporting the good from factory to the
carrier. CIF is FOB plus cost of shipping to the importing country and marine insurance.
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trade was zero and then estimate with (upper limit) Tobit.12 Re-estimating using
OLS on just the non-zero flows with data provided on Nuno Lima˜o’s website,
we find ρˆ = 0.07. We have to be cautious about all of these estimates because
Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) show that matched CIF and FOB data from
different reporters do not yield reliable measures of the CIF/FOB ratio. They
point out: ‘Roughly half of all observations in the IMF DOTS database lie out-
side a reasonable range of variation (ad valorem costs between 0% and 100%).’
When we restrict τ to the ‘reasonable range’ (i.e., τ < 2), we obtain ρˆ = 0.026.
Hummels (2007) pioneers a second method, calculating freight costs for a
country that collects bothCIFandFOB import values.He specifies the dependent
variable as the log of the freight to value ratio, ln(τ − 1). We will use ρ˜ to denote
the elasticity of τ − 1 with respect to distance. In columns 1 and 3 of table 2,
Hummels (2007) estimates ρ˜ = 0.27 and 0.15 for air and sea transport into the
US, respectively. As pointed out byAnderson and vanWincoop (2004), ρ is much
smaller than ρ˜. In our notation, ρ = ρ˜(τ − 1)/τ . In the Hummels data (τ − 1)/τ
is less than 0.1, so ρ is an order of magnitude smaller than ρ˜. Alternatively, one
can estimate ρ directly just by re-specifying the dependent variable as ln(τ ). Using
the data David Hummels provides on his website, we estimate that ρ = 0.03 for
air transport and ρ = 0.01 for sea transport.
A third method for measuring ρ relies on direct freight cost data generally
obtained from private shipment companies. Lima˜o and Venables (2001) use the
cost of shipping a standard container from Baltimore to 64 countries where the
World Bank has operations. They estimate a linear relationship between freight
costs and distance. Using the Lima˜o and Venables data, we estimate ρ˜ = 0.32.
Whenwe apply the (τ − 1)/τ correction using τ = 0.07 (obtained fromHummels
2007), figure 6 (showing ad valorem ocean shipping rates) yields ρ = 0.021.
Taking together all the freight-based methods, we would say that the reason-
able range for the elasticity of the log CIF to FOB ratio with respect to distance
is 0.01 < ρ < 0.07, the best estimates being at the lower end of this range. For
these values to be consistent with a unit distance elasticity δ = 1, the trade elas-
ticity, |  | would have to be in the 14–100 range, magnitudes that few would take
seriously. Conversely, papers that assume or estimate reasonable  are bound to
estimate ρ outside the range implied by the freight data regressions.13
We can reconcile the two sets of results by decomposing trade costs into two
components: d ln τ = d ln τf + d ln τd , where τf is one plus the freight to value
ratio (the CIF to FOB ratio) and τd is the ‘dark’ trade cost. We use dark here not
to suggest something sinister, but rather to make an analogy with astrophysics –
which seems fitting, since the term ‘gravity’ itself was coined as a physics analogy.
12 If zero trade flows occur for bilateral pairs, owing to prohibitively high freight costs, then
excluding those flows could induce selection bias, On the other hand, the zero flows could arise
from declaration thresholds or prohibitively high fixed market entry costs, rather than freight
costs. In that case the top coding of transport costs would be inappropriate.
13 For example, Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) assume σ = 3.8 and estimate a Pareto
shape parameter of 5.2 and a ρ of 0.16.
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In cosmology, dark energy is invoked to explain why the universe appears to be
expanding at an accelerating rate and dark matter explains why galaxies rotate
at higher velocity than they should based on their observed mass. Neither dark
energy nor dark matter can be observed directly, but their presence is inferred to
be huge. Taken together, dark energy and dark matter are thought to account for
95%of themass-energy in the universe. Our goal here is to infer the importance of
unobserved or difficult-to-observe trade costs. Letting ρf denote the elasticity of
τf with respect to distance (observed) and ρd be the corresponding dark elasticity,
the observed distance effect can be expressed as
δ = −(ρf + ρd).
Taking δ ≈ 1 and  ≈ −4, we can infer 0.18 ≤ ρd ≤ 0.24. This implies 72%–96%
of the rise in trade costs associatedwith distance is attributable to the dark sources
of resistance. We are not alone in attributing a high share of the distance effect to
dark trade costs. Allen (2012) estimates that search costs account for 90% of the
distance effect, leaving only 10% for transport costs. Feyrer (2009) uses the closing
of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975 to investigate the effect of changes in
bilateral shipping distances. This allows him to control for dyadic fixed effects
and thereby isolate the pure effect of changing transportation costs on trade. The
resulting δ ranges from 0.15 to 0.5. Assuming that Feyrer’s δs correspond to−ρf
and maintaining  = −4 imply 0.038 ≤ ρf ≤ 0.125. Therefore, dark trade costs
account for 50%–85% of the effect of distance on trade flows.14 We will try to
uncover the underlying dark mechanisms in section 4. The next two subsections
consider the evolution of distance effects over time and the border effect.
3.4. Distance effects: why won’t the world flatten?
Leamer (2007) expresses considerable frustration over Friedman’s ‘flat world’
metaphor, whose meaning Leamer diplomatically describes as ‘elusive.’ Here we
use the metaphor in a very precise way. We will say the world is flattening if the
lines shown in figure 3 are flattening, that is if the distance elasticity is declining.
If we take gravity theory seriously, does it actually predict declining distance
effects? In order for distance costs to fall over time, we need either a reduction in
ρ or in−. We are inclined to think that transport improvements should lower ρ.
Looking back on the last half-century of innovations in technological progress
and deregulation in transportation and communication, one could point tomany
reasons why trade resistance should have fallen. The following list includes some
of the most notable changes.
14 The greater importance that the Suez-closing results attribute to transport costs may derive
from including not just the pure freight carrier cost of distance but also the additional time cost
from the longer trip.
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1) Containerization dramatically lowered the cost and time of shipping manu-
factured goods.15
2) Commercial jet air transport costs fell by 90% from 1955 to 2004.16
3) International telephone costs per minute fell 95% from 1980 to 2010.17
4) Internet-based communication (email, Skype, eBay, Alibaba, etc.) increased
the ‘bandwidth’ of long-distance information flows and reduced their mon-
etary cost to near zero.
All these factors suggest declines in rni. The item in the above list with a direct
link to the elasticity of transport costs with respect to distance (ρ) is the de-
cline in the cost per mile of jet transport. The most prominent innovation in sea
transport technology, containerization, mainly reduced port costs. Bernhofen,
El-Sahli, and Kneller (2013) cite a McKinsey study to conclude: ‘The construc-
tion of purpose-designed container terminals increased the productivity of dock
labor from 1.7 to 30 tons per hour.’ Lower port costs would show up as a re-
duction in β in the resistance function. However, Hummels (2007) points to
an indirect effect that could lower ρ: ‘Because containerships spend more time
steaming, investments in larger, faster ships become feasible.’ Such ships ‘sub-
stantially reduce the price per ton-mile.’ The new communication technologies
reduce ρ for information-intensive service trade. To see their effect on goods
trade, we will have to consider the complementarity between information and
goods flows.
Thus, we have some reason to believe that ρ has been falling. However, it
is far from obvious which direction, if any, the trade elasticity, , should have
moved over the last decades. In Armington models, a rise in |  | would occur if
products become closer substitutes. Broda andWeinstein (2006) find evidence of
the opposite trend. They estimate product-specific σ for the two periods 1972–
1988 and 1990–2001. Themean σ for disaggregated goods falls from 17.3 to 12.6,
whereas the median falls from 3.7 to 3.1. These correspond to decreases in |  |
of 22% and 29%, respectively. Hanson (2005) also finds a declining value of σ
(14% between 1970–1980 and 1980–1990 in the main regression), with a radically
different estimation method relying on a wage equation of the New Economic
Geography type. In Ricardian and Melitzian models, |  | rises when industries
or firms become more similar in terms of productivities. We are not aware of
evidence that preference or technologies are evolving over time in such a way as
to predict a rise in |  |. Indeed, the size distribution of firms is thought to be
governed reasonably well by a stable power law.
15 See The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller . . . and Bernhofen,
El-Sahli, and Kneller (2013 ) for descriptive and quantitative assessments of the transformative
role of containerization.
16 See Hummels (2007, figure 1).
17 See FCC report ‘Trends in the international telecommunications industry: summary through
2010,’ table 2.
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FIGURE 5 Rising distance effects
With |  | stable or moderately declining, and ρ probably declining, δ should
be falling as well. However, a stable value of δ near 1 would be consistent with
the model of Chaney (2013), who writes, ‘even if technological, political or eco-
nomic changes affect the particular shape of firm level exports, in the aggregate,
the gravity equation remains essentially unaffected.’ With these expectations in-
formed by theory in mind, we now turn to actual estimates of the evolution of
the distance effect over time.
Figure 5 graphs a series of δˆt estimated in cross-section regressions. In every
case there are origin and destination fixed effects and a set of standard gravity
covariates (common language, contiguity, RTAs, common currency, past and
current colonial link). The simplest specification (linear in logs regression on the
whole sample – the unbalanced OLS line of panel (a)) exhibits a very steady rise
in distance effects. This tendency for increasing effects of distance over time is
known as the ‘distance puzzle’ in the literature. One simple explanation for it
would be that over that period, the end of colonies and the surge in regional
trading arrangements have made short-distance trade easier in relative terms.
However, our list of controls includes those determinants and therefore accounts
for those trends.
Alternative explanations involve evolution of the gravity sample over time.
Indeed, it is very well known that the number of positive flows currently in the
bilateral trade flowmatrix ismuch larger now than in the 1960s. If those ‘entrants’
in the trade data are pairs of countries with relatively long distance and small
flows (which we have good reasons to believe should be the case theoretically),
it could explain the trend in distance effects. Panel (a) investigates the samples
hypothesis, by first restricting the sample to the set of dyads with positive trade
over the entire period. The trend is still upwards, but with a a slope that is much
less steep. We then investigate heterogeneous effects by restricting the sample to
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the set of dyads with both balanced data and high expected trade values (top
50% and top 25% of naive gravity predicted trade). The conclusion of those
two sets of regressions is that distance effects of a balanced set of high traders
are relatively stable over time. On the contrary, distance effects are rising most
for the new and low-trading countries. This finding is related to the impact of
using Poisson rather than linear regressions on the distance puzzle. Bosquet and
Boulhol (2009) first showed that the distance effects were muchmore stable when
Poisson is used. One key difference between PPML and OLS is that the former
puts a lot more weight on high expected trade dyads, since it tries to minimize the
distance between real and expected trade in levels rather than in logs. Panel (b)
of the figure investigates the issue deeper, proceeding with quantile regressions
for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the unbalanced sample. Again, as
the expected level of trade rises, the rise in distance effects over time is less
pronounced. Last, we present the results for the estimation method proposed
by Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012), running PPML on shares of bilateral
imports over total expenditure rather than on levels. Intuitively, this should give
less weight to large absolute values of trade than PPML on levels. The results
seem to be quite intermediate between OLS and PPML.
Overall, our figure therefore presents consistent evidence of heterogeneous
(non-constant) effects of distance, with lower impacts for larger trade flows. We
hypothesize that estimated distance effects are rising because of a combination
of changing participation in trade and a non-constant trade cost elasticity.
Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2013) develop a non-Pareto version of the
Melitz/Chaney model that can make sense of this pattern of implied differ-
ences in trade cost elasticities. The key to understanding heterogeneity over time
in the distance effect may be its cross-sectional heterogeneity. From 1960 to the
present: new countries start exporting and existing countries initiate new positive
dyads. Since they were not exporting before, the new flows are for low-cost cut-
off and low probability of exporting origin-destinations. In a log-normal model,
these dyads have higher absolute trade elasticities. The already positive dyads
could have relatively stable elasticities. The combination of new high elasticity
dyads and stable incumbents raises the average elasticity – if the estimator ‘pays
attention’ to small dyads. Our results offer an explanation for why methods that
weight the data differently obtain such different results.18
3.5. Border effects: in decline, but still puzzling
Using a naive gravity equation, McCallum (1995) showed 1988 trade between
Canadian provinces was about 20 times higher than trade between province-state
pairs of comparable size and distance. This paper started a literature, interested
18 Duranton and Storper (2008) provide an alternative account emphasizing the changing nature
of what is traded as trade costs fall. In their model lower transport costs lead to great trade in
custom-made machines. Trade in these varieties is more distance sensitive than for standardized
machines.
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FIGURE 6 Border effects illustrated
in three main objects: (1) the evaluation of the effects of borders other than
US-Canada (e.g., within the EU, for developing countries); (2) the appropriate
ways to estimate a border effect, taking into account the underlying theory; and
(3) the explanation of the high levels of border effects that were invariably found.
Before considering each of these issues, we illustrate the border effect concept
using figure 6. It depicts flows of goods between Canadian provinces, American
states, and between states and provinces. The thicknesses of these lines are drawn
proportional to the amount traded on each route. The four circles are sized in
proportion to the value of shipments that are both produced and consumed in
each province or state (i.e., ‘exports to self’). Two facts emerge that are very
important. First, there is clearly very strong trade between each province and
its adjacent state. This would be even more extreme if we had chosen Michigan
instead of NewYork because of the massive auto-related flows between southern
Ontario and the Detroit area. To determine if these adjacent cross-border flows
were above or below the gravity norm, we would have to be quite confident that
we were measuring the distance correctly. Second, trade with self is very high
(we actually had to rescale it to be able to fit the circles in the figure) but it is
conceptually difficult to say whether it is too high because a province’s distance
to self is a problematic concept.
The flows we want to focus on in figure 6 are the eight long-distance flows, four
that cross national borders and four that do not. It should be clear that the latter
are much larger than the former, despite the distances being approximately the
same in the figure. The distances are even more similar in reality. According to
Google Maps, the actual driving distances are 4372km (Vancouver to Toronto),
4392 (Vancouver to Buffalo), 4156 (Seattle to Toronto), and 4176 (Seattle to
Buffalo).
The border effect is typically estimated using gravity regressions that control
for country size anddistance, looking for a discontinuity in the trade cost function
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associated with crossing the international border. Whenever a discontinuity is
estimated, we need to worry whether it actually just reflects some non-linearity in
the distance cost function. To assuage such concerns, we calculate theCanada-US
border effect without parameterizing the distance function – or even estimating
a regression at all. In contrast to the examples given by McCallum (1995), the
newmethod we propose takes the model seriously; it is constructed in such a way
as to eliminate the troublesome multilateral resistance terms.
Recall that Xni = GSiMn/rni. Rather than force the power function form
on distance, let cross-border resistance = rni = βnig(Dni). For the within bor-
der dyads βbo = βob = βwn = βnw = 1, whereas for goods that cross a border
the increase in resistance is determined by identity of the importer, where
βow = βbn = βa and βwo = βnb = βc. The geometric mean of the within-border
flows divided by the geometric mean of the cross-border flows provides our
estimate of the border effect:
b = (XboXobXwnXnw)
(1/4)
(XbnXnbXwoXow)(1/4)
=
√
βcβa
√
g(Dbn)g(Dwo)
g(Dbo)g(Dwn)
. (5)
Since we picked our four trading entities such that Dbo ≈ Dbn and Dwo ≈ Dwn,
the second factor above is approximately one. As a consequence, b corresponds
to the geometric mean of the two border resistances. In 2007 our calculations
yield b = 7.3, well below theMcCallum figure of 22 but above the Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) value of 5.
Like the distance effect, δ, the border effect can be decomposed as the product
of the trade elasticity and the impact of the border on delivery costs. The latter
can be expressed as one plus the ad valorem tariff charged at customs, denote tc,
plus the ad valorem equivalent of any dark costs associatedwith crossing borders,
which we will denote td . Thus, omitting the origin-destination subscripts, we have
lnβ = − ln(1 + tc + td), (6)
where the left-hand side can be estimated as the coefficient on a dummy that
equals 1 for trade flows that do not cross a national border. As before, we take
 = −4 as the current consensus estimate of the trade elasticity.McCallum (1995)
estimates l̂nβ = 3.09 in 1988. At that time, the production-weighted aver-
age Canadian tariff was 4.4%. Solving for td in equation (6), we obtain
td = exp(3.09/4) − 0.044 − 1 = 1.25. Non-tariff aspects of the border have the
equivalent impact of a 125% tariff and they constitute 96% of the total tariff
equivalent.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) set out to ‘solve the famous McCallum
border puzzle.’ Their key idea was that border effect measurement must take into
account differences in multilateral resistance, denoted −1i and 
−1
n in the struc-
tural gravity model. Using 1993 data that included state-to-state shipments mea-
sured as part of the US Commodity Flow Survey, Anderson and van Wincoop
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(2003) estimate l̂nβ = 1.62. Five years into the implementation of the Canada-
US FTA, about half the original tariffs had been eliminated. Plugging in the new
numbers, td = 49%, again about 96% of the total tariff equivalent of the border.
The BC-ON-NY-WA border effect of 7.3 reported above corresponds to a tariff-
equivalent of 64%. all of which is dark, given that duties had been eliminated
almost a decade before. Of course, this is but one observation. However, the states
and provinces we use are large and important and so it is not an example that
can be dismissed.
Head andMayer (2013) collect 71 different structural (including country fixed
effects or the equivalent) estimates of the border coefficient. The median l̂nβ
estimated with country fixed effects (or the equivalent) is 1.55. The current trade-
weighted world average MFN tariff is 3.8%. These numbers imply td = 43.5%,
about 92% of the full tariff equivalent. The trade-weighted tariff underestimates
the importance of tariffs in the world economy, since it down-weights precisely
the observations where tariffs have eliminated the most trade. We can bracket
our estimates by using the simple average world tariff, 12.5%, In that case the
implied td shrinks to 34.5%, but this still represents 72% of the total impact of
the border. The inescapable conclusion is that border effects are equivalent to
very high tariffs, and actual tariffs can explain only a small share of this. The
rest, over 90% in most of the cases considered, has to be attributed to the dark
costs of selling to consumers across borders.
Our category of dark costs encompasses everything other than tariffs. This
misses an important distinction. There are a set of border compliance costs that
are not as easy to measure as tariffs, but they can be assessed through careful
study and their effects are easily understood. Such costs were a major focus of
the 1988 Cecchini Report of the European Economic Community. They have
also attracted attention in Canada, especially because the costs appear to have
increased as a consequence of heightened securitymeasures since 9/11.At the risk
of abusing our astrophysics analogy, we can call these ‘grey’ border costs. Most
calculations show that they are non-negligible but far too small to explainmuchof
the total effect of borders described above. For example, the Cecchini calculation
of the total ‘direct cost of customs formalities and the administrative costs that
derive from them’ was 1.8% of the value of goods traded.19 Head and Mayer
(2000) estimate the border coefficient between EU members from 1984 to 1986
to be 2.75. The tariff equivalent is 99%. The situation at the Canada-US border is
similar. Based on field work in 2002, Taylor, Robideaux, and Jackson (2004) put
the total cost of delays, uncertainty, and customs clearance costs at 2.0%–3.4% ad
valorem.While larger than the figure for the EU, even the upper estimate remains
puny compared with the total border cost tariff equivalent. We conclude that, as
in the case of distance effects, we are going to need unconventional sources of
resistance to explain the effects of borders.
19 http://www.thefederalist.eu/index.php?option=com_content&id=391&lang=en.
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FIGURE 7 Border effects are large, but declining
Concerning the evolution over time of those border effects, the impact of
national borders appears to be falling in most samples. The first such finding
was Helliwell (1998), who estimated a series of McCallum-style regressions and
found the border effect fell from 17 to 12 in the period 1991–1996. Head and
Mayer (2000) andDe Sousa,Mayer, and Zignago (2012) estimated border effects
for the EU and world and also found falling border effects even when accounting
for multilateral resistance terms, as shown in figure 7.
Similar to the dark part of the explanation for the level of border effects, there
is room for mystery in their time pattern. The most obvious reason to expect
border effects to decline is tariff reductions. In Canada and the US there were
indeed some tariff reductions (associated with the phase-in of the Canada-US
FTA from 1989 to 1998) during Helliwell’s estimation period. With  = −4,
the observed decline in the border effect implies an 18 percentage point tariff
reduction, much larger than the actual average reduction of approximately 3
percentage points. Intra-EU trade has been tariff-free since 1968, that is, before
the start of the estimation period in Head and Mayer (2000). Hence, none of
the decline observed in figure 7(a) – equivalent to a 25 percentage point20 tariff
reduction between the late 1970s and early 1990s – can be explained by tariffs.
De Sousa et al. (2012) find similar declines in their global sample, even when
the evolution of bilateral tariffs is controlled for. Harmonization of regulation
or reductions in other ‘grey’ border costs might have played a role in the falling
effects of borders. Head and Mayer (2000), however, find very little evidence of
this for the single market program (SMP) implemented in Europe in the late
1980s. The simplest evidence of this is the vertical line in figure 7(a), which
indicates the start of the SMP. No change in the declining trend of the border
effects seems discernible. The SMP policies have very little explanatory power in
20 This calculation is based on the first and last columns of Head and Mayer (2000, table 5):
exp(3.04/4)−exp(2.54/4) = 0.251.
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regressions with the level and change of the EU border effects as the dependent
variables.
To sum up, figure 7 makes it clear that, despite going in the intuitive direction
of being reduced in recent years, the impact of national borders remains very
strong, contradicting once again the claims that the world is now a flat surface
on which goods can slide effortlessly. We are therefore facing two puzzles, one
for distance and one for borders: despite technological and policy changes that
should by now have made distance and borders unimportant, their influence
remains of first order. We now turn to explanations of this current state of
‘unfinished’ globalization.
4. Explaining high distance and border effects
The obvious sources of resistance – traditional trade barriers such as tariffs at the
border and freight costs of moving goods across space – do not appear sufficient.
Grossman (1998) argued that distance effects are too large to be explained by
freight costs (and also that it is the wrong functional form). He proposed three
possible explanations:
1) ‘imperfect information where familiarity declines rapidly with distance’
2) ‘very localized tastes (as in Trefler’s ‘home bias’), which are historically de-
termined and change only slowly with experience’
3) ‘distribution networks play a more central role.’
In a seminal paper Rauch (1999) proposed a broader view of the importance
of networks encompassing much more than just distribution networks. Helliwell
(2002) argues that such networks are key underlying determinants of border and
distance effects.
Networks and common norms, often described as social capital, underlie suc-
cessful interactions of all types . . . These networks are fuelled by mutual trust,
abetted by common institutions, and lubricated by frequent interactions. All of
these decline with distance and as national borders are crossed. Although chang-
ing costs and technologies have radically altered the scope for long-distance and
transborder linkages, the scale of these is still dwarfed by the density of local
contacts. (74)
Thus, the hypothesis is that the structure of business networks exhibits border
and distance effects, which are then manifested in trade patterns. This begs the
questions of why networks would have such a structure. The answer implicit in
the Helliwell quote and Rauch’s use of a colony/language ‘links’ variable to test
his theory is that current networks were shaped by history. If networks are the
principal conduits of information, we can infer a role for history in Grossman’s
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declining familiarity hypothesis. A role for history is explicit in the Grossman
localized tastes hypothesis.
In sum, our scepticism about the ability of contemporaneous measured trade
barriers to account for persistently high distance and border effects leads us to
conclude that the answer may lie in the past.Nunn (2009) surveys an increasingly
sophisticated literature that establishes that historical circumstances have long
run effects on economic performance. Twokeymechanisms are institutions (often
set by colonizers) and cultural norms.
Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) is the first effort we know of to inject the past
into trade. They did so by adding lagged bilateral trade to the set of explanatory
variables in the gravity equation. Content with their results, Irwin and Eichen-
green concluded the paper with the pronouncement: ‘we will never run another
gravity equation that excludes lagged trade flows. If our paper is successful (and
widely read) neither will other investigators.’ Estimations with lagged dependent
variables generally leave results that admit of two very different interpretations:
path dependence vs. unobserved heterogeneity. In other words the significance
of lagged trade may have little to do with history if it simply captures omitted
determinants of bilateral trade. We are convinced that progress can be made only
by exploring direct evidence for specific historical mechanisms. There are two
hypotheses of particular interest:
 historical isolation or conflict =⇒ low bilateral business network connections
=⇒ lack of information
 historical isolation (lack of cross-migration + high trade costs) =⇒ evolution
of home-variety biased preferences.
4.1. Informational impediments to trade
A satisfying explanation for why distance has a large effect on trade in goods
should take into account the fact that distance has a similarly large effect on a va-
riety of other flows and transactions that do not involve physically moving goods.
Estimated distance effects for commercial services and foreign direct investment
(FDI) are remarkably similar to those estimated for goods using comparable
methods and samples. Head et al. (2009) find a commercial services distance
effect of 1.2 in 2006, compared to 1.4 for goods using the same sample, method,
and explanatory variables. Head and Ries (2008) estimate an FDI distance effect
of 1.25 and a cross-border M&A effect of 0.92. All these specifications include
importer and exporter fixed effects. In the case of commercial services, distance
effects might arise due to the need for face-to-face delivery, which in turn requires
travel. Since FDI by definition entails some controlling influence onmanagement
it may also involve travel.
It does not seem sensible to invoke a travel explanation for the distance effects
estimated for portfolio investment, web browsing, and patent citations since none
of these require proximity of the two parties in the transaction. Coeurdacier and
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Martin (2009) find distance effects of 0.4, 0.7, and 0.5 for equity, bond, and bank
assets (respectively). While these estimates are smaller than those typical for
goods, we cannot compare them reliably because the authors included bilateral
trade in goods as a control. Thiswould be expected to rob someof the explanatory
power from distance.
A unified explanation for distance effects in all these cases is that they all in-
volve information. For almost all forms of exchange, information about ‘product’
quality and vendor trustworthiness is paramount – and hard to obtain remotely.
Even when there is no buyer or seller involved, information can facilitate a flow
that would not otherwise occur. For example, an inventor writing a patent ap-
plication should cite all the prior work that is relevant. In practice, however, she
will cite the prior work she is familiar with. Thus if one can control for relevance,
a negative distance effect on citations points to spatial decay of familiarity, the
second Grossman hypothesis.
Huang (2007) investigates an implication of Grossman’s hypothesis that dis-
tance proxies for familiarity. The key idea is that if distance is a proxy for lack
of information, which leads to uncertainty, then greater aversion to uncertainty
should cause larger distance effects. Using the influential cross-country survey by
Hofstede,Huang estimates that countries that aremore averse to uncertainty have
larger distance effects on their exports. He shows that this result comes mainly
from differentiated products. Rauch (1999) argues that such products are subject
to greater informational impediments. Products with international organized ex-
changes or reference prices – that is, the products that Rauch hypothesizes suffer
less from information problems – do exhibit smaller interactions.
Hortac¸su, Martinez-Jerez, and Douglas (2009) find that eBay transactions
have a distance elasticity of−0.07. This is much smaller than the near unit elastic-
ities estimated for commodity flows within the United States. One interpretation,
consistent with Rauch, is that eBay is functioning as a conduit of information
about the availability of products with specific desired attributes. For non-eBay
transactions, the declining familiarity effect is much larger. The residual distance
effect could come from distance-decay in information that eBay cannot convey.
Supporting this interpretation is the finding that the distance elasticity does not
change when the authors control for shipping costs. More surprising is the find-
ing that transactions are 75% more likely to occur within the same state (after
controlling for distance and state fixed effects). The in-state effect should have
been negative given that sales taxes are only applicable when the buyer and seller
reside in the same state. Hortac¸su, Martinez-Jerez, and Douglas (2007) suggest
different levels of trust may underlie these effects, perhaps because ‘increased
possibility of direct enforcement of the trade agreement, either by returning the
good in person or by compelling the seller to deliver on his or her promise.’ They
find support for this hypothesis by interacting distance and same-state with an
indicator for states whose median seller has poor reliability ratings. When the
median seller is classified as ‘very bad,’ the distance effect rises from −0.07 to
−0.11 and the same-state effect rises from 1.75 to 4.44!
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Lendle et al. (2012) estimate gravity equations for eBay and ‘offline’ trade for
similar goods using 62 countries. They find much larger distance effects for eBay
transactions than Hortac¸su, Martinez-Jerez, and Douglas (2007), −0.38, with
near unit elasticities for offline trade using the same specification. Corroborating
Hortac¸su, Martinez-Jerez, and Douglas (2007), they also find that transactions
involving less trustworthy sellers have higher absolute distance effects. More-
over they find that distance elasticities between eBay and offline transactions
seem to converge at intermediate values when the countries involved are high
Google/internet users and not perceived as corrupt. Collectively, the eBay re-
sults support a view of trade where (a) lack of information is a key impediment,
(b) eBay partially solves the problem.
The natural question is why should information be subject to iceberg melting
with distance? If we have a Wikipedia model of information transmission, then
everyonewould have access to the same information nomatter where they resided
spatially relative to each other. The spatial decay of information we observe em-
pirically suggests another form of diffusion. Suppose that the type of information
that drives transactions is mainly not broadcast but rather conveyed selectively
within business networks. Then if those business networks have a geographic
bias, so will the resulting pattern of information flows.21
A different, but related set of evidence on the impact of distance on informa-
tion focuses on knowledge flows, based primarily on citation patterns and their
spatial decay. This is currently the main ‘trace’ left by flows of knowledge, and
have generated quite a large literature.22 While the initial approach used matched
local and non-local patents, Peri (2005) analyzes citations using a gravity equa-
tion, except that he uses distance intervals rather than the standard log distance
parameterization. He shows that most of the national border effect occurs within
the limits of the region where knowledge is generated. Starting with an initial
knowledge stock of 100 in a EU region, there is only 20% left when crossing a
regional border inside the same country, 12.4%when leaving the country, and the
slope of decay becomes then very flat at −0.03 for each bin of 1000 kms covered.
Li (2012) estimates a more standard gravity specification and finds distance elas-
ticity on citation of −0.12 (when she excludes self-citation). The elasticity falls
to −0.02 when considering only patents above 15 years old.23
Griffith, Lee, and Van Reenen (2011) examine the speed at which new patents
are cited at home compared with when they are cited in other countries. Despite
the title ‘Is distance dying at last?’ the paper estimates only the degree of home
21 Chaney (2013) models how geographically biased patterns of initial contacts emerge and lead to
distance effects of δ ≈ 1. Allen (2012) attributes 90% of distance effects in Philippine
agricultural trade to information, estimating a model where producers randomly search in
different markets to learn about the local retail price.
22 It is quite likely that, with the rise of tools like Google Scholar, flows of knowledge based on
citations of research articles becomes a new popular data source used for identification of the
importance of proximity on knowledge and innovation.
23 When controls for 3-digit patent-class effects are added, the corresponding elasticities fall to
−0.04 and −0.02, respectively.
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bias, what we would term the border effect. The key finding is that the bias
towards citing domestic patents first at home is declining over time. Comin,
Dmitriev, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) also focus on the geographic diffusion of
knowledge. Instead of measuring this with citations, they examine adoption of
‘20 major technologies in 161 countries over the last 140 years.’ In a structural
model they estimate that the frequency of interactions decays by 73% every
1000 km for the median technology. As predicted by their model, geographic
interactions in adoption taper off as the technology diffuses.
4.2. Localized, historically determined tastes
The world’s needs and desires have become irrevocably homogenized.
Theodore Levitt, Harvard Business Review 1983
Marketing professor Theodore Levitt was one of the early proponents of the view
that markets were already globalized. Based on the empirical claim above, Levitt
pointed to the ascendancy of the ‘global corporation’ that ‘sells the same things
in the same way everywhere.’ As with subsequent globalization boosters, Levitt
attributed the changes in large part to technology. Writing a decade before the
release of the first web browser (Mosaic), the technology Levitt was talking about
was not the internet, but rather television and inexpensive jet travel. These tech-
nologies heightened awareness of consumption opportunities in other countries.
‘Almost everyone everywhere wants all the things they have heard about, seen,
or experienced via the new technologies.’ Later he observes ‘Ancient differences
in national tastes . . . disappear.’
Reading Levitt, and then reflecting on the last 30 years of technological
progress culminating in the worldwide success of the ‘Gangnam Style’ YouTube
video, Grossman’s hypothesis of localized, historically determined tastes seems
utterly quaint and out-dated. Yet Levitt made empirically testable claims. Hence,
it makes sense to approach the issue by looking at what the data say. A variety of
studies point to persistent, spatially correlated, heterogeneity within and between
countries.24
As we have tried to do whenever possible, we begin by illustrating raw data
phenomena. Figure 8, kindly prepared for us by Jose´ de Sousa, shows how
allocation of total expenditures on fats and oils are allocated between (a) butter
and (b) olive oil in France in 2005. Panel (a) shows butter demand appears to be
spatially concentrated in the northwestern regions of Normandy and Brittany. In
contrast olive oil demand is especially strong in theMediterranean de´partements,
as shown in panel (b). The pronounced demand differences cannot be easily
24 There is also evidence that for television, music, and movies have much more limited effects on
domestic culture than Levitt claims. Disdier, Head, and Mayer (2010) estimate the impact of
media on names given by French parents from 1967 to 2002. Using the estimated parameters, a
counterfactual exercise suggests that even if foreign media had been banned entirely from
France, fewer than 5% of French babies would have been named differently.
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FIGURE 8 Expenditure shares (out of all fats and oils) of 10,240 French households, 2005–2006
dismissed as the consequences of price differences since the latter seem rather
minimal. A recent check on the Carrefour online store revealed that a stick of
butter costs € 0.97 in Rennes and € 1.06 in Marseille whereas a bottle of olive oil
costs € 6.05 in Rennes and € 6.26 in Marseille.25
The localized tastes hypothesis explains such demand differences as arising
mainly because of history. Before rapid, cheap, refrigerated transportation be-
came available, it seems likely that butterwould have been unavailable inMarseille
or at least priced very unattractively. The converse would be true for olive oil in
Brittany. Consumers would rationally use the locally supplied form of fat and
would adopt recipes featuring this ingredient. Children would be habituated to
the taste of the local variant. Producers would also develop skills in manufac-
turing butter in the North and olive oil in the South. The production-side im-
provements would further motivate taste adjustment. Cultural evolution would
thereby result in differences in preferences that could be expected to persist even
after falling transport costs had driven down price differences.
Detecting spatial patterns in tastes is clearly more challenging if the goods
themselves are subject to the confounding factor of distance-related transport
costs. Music, being ‘weightless’ and mainly unpriced, seems like a product where
we can safely rule out distance matter because of transport costs. Ferreira and
Waldfogel (2012) show music market shares follow a gravity equation that is
remarkably similar to the one exhibited by trade in goods. Success in foreign
markets is predictably higher if the market is proximate and shares a common
25 To be specific, the butter prices are for 125 g of President butter and the olive oil prices are for
one litre of Puget extra virgin olive oil. We checked prices on 29 May 2013.
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language. The elasticity with respect to distance is 0.31, lower than observed
for goods but higher than domestic eBay transactions and patent citations cited
in the previous section.26 The authors find that distance effects are stable over
time but home bias, always large, has risen substantially since the 1980s. At their
low point, the same country coefficient was 1, implying domestic market shares
were almost triple the gravity benchmark. By the end of the sample they had
risen to 2.5, implying a ten-fold preference for domestic music. These results
sharply contradict the Theodore Levitt view of irrevocable homogenization of
preferences.
A related piece of evidence for ‘weightless’ products comes from Blum and
Goldfarb (2006) who show that distance reduces website visits with a very large
elasticity (δ ≈ 3) for ‘taste-dependent digital products, such as music, games, and
pornography.’ Though imprecisely estimated, the effect is statistically significant.
For other sites, the distance effect is generally much smaller and not statistically
significant. Head and Mayer (2008) find distance effects within France used to
have a significant impact on differences in tastes in names for children, but the
distance decay of name similarity has all but disappeared over timewithinFrance.
Atkin (2013b) formalizes the hypothesis of localized, historically determined
tastes in the context of cereals consumption in India. Controlling for price dif-
ferences, he estimates region-cereal specific preference parameters. The taste for
a cereal is negatively related to prices in the past, evidencing habit formation,
and positively related to endowments (cropland suitable for rice, wheat, etc.).
Thus, Northern, wheat producing states have larger wheat dummies in their de-
mand functions. Finally the paper points to an important implication of localized
tastes: the caloric gains from trade are much diminished compared to a model
with identical tastes and no habit formation.
If habits are set in childhood, then one powerful way to identify taste differ-
ences is to compare behavior ofmigrants in their newhomes to that of nativeswho
grew up there. Both types face the same prices so identification of preference pa-
rameters is easier than if the econometrician has to purge out the effects of inter-
regional differences in price and availability. Atkin (2013a) finds that migrants
within India retain the preferences of their origin states. As a result they pay a 7%
‘cultural penalty’ – measured as the reduction in calories consumed if the des-
tination village has high prices for their preferred home varieties. Bronnenberg,
Dube´, and Gentzkow (2012) examine brand preferences of migrants within the
United States. Their dependent variable is top brand’s share of expenditures on
the top two brands in each of 238 packaged goods categories. Migrants’ gaps
in top brand shares relative to natives close by 60% in the year of arrival. The
authors interpret this as the immediate impact of the change in supply conditions
26 Ferreira and Waldfogel (2012) estimate many of their regressions with a control for the share of
artists exporting. This controls for the extensive margin and leads to marked drops in the
coefficients on other variables. Distance effects, for example, fall to 0.14. We focus on the table 4
specification (1) results because they combine both margins and are thus comparable with the
other gravity specifications we report in the paper.
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TABLE 1
Meta-analysis of colony-related indicators
All gravity Structural∗ gravity
Estimates: Median Mean s.d. # Median Mean s.d. #
Colonial link 0.91 0.92 0.61 147 0.84 0.75 0.49 60
Same language 0.49 0.54 0.44 680 0.33 0.39 0.29 205
Same currency 0.87 0.79 0.48 104 0.98 0.86 0.39 37
RTA/FTA 0.47 0.59 0.5 257 0.28 0.36 0.42 108
∗Structural here means either country fixed effects or a ratio method.
and infer that 40% of the gaps can therefore be attributed to persistent brand
preferences. With more time in the new location, market shares close gradually,
with the slowest convergence observed for migrants who arrive as adults.
We see the data as supporting a model along the lines of the following sketch:
Preferences evolve towards locally available goods/varieties. Thus, far from the
olive trees lining theMediterranean coasts, Britons andBretonsmake butter their
fat of choice. Local supply in turn co-evolves with local preferences since a large
demand will reinforce the initially favourable supply-side conditions. Tastes are
transmitted vertically from parent to child via childhood habituation (food) and
parental effort tomaintain culture (religion, etc.). The only things that can disrupt
the tendency towards divergence of tastes are trade openness and migration: (i)
easier trade of goods can confront people with alien varieties so cheap that it
overcomes the initial taste resistance, (ii) migrants bring their preferences with
them. While they tend to assimilate over time, migrants expose their cultural
traits to natives, resulting in at least some experimentation and adoption by
locals. Since migrants mainly move nearby, this creates a tendency for proximate
locations to have similar preferences. Some elements of themodel we have inmind
are contained in Olivier, Thoenig, and Verdier (2008) and Maystre et al. (2009),
in particular the endogenous effort parents make to transmit their cultural traits
when confronted with rising foreign influence.
4.3. Persistent colonial legacies
Revisiting figure 3, we see that many of the observations above the gravity pre-
diction line are former colonies of France and francophone countries. And of
course we note the high level of overlap in the two categories. Former colonies of
France also frequently use the French legal system. Eight former French colonies
in West Africa use a currency, the CFA franc, that is pegged to the euro.
Table 1 returns to the meta-analysis conducted in Head andMayer (2013) and
focuses on results for three colony-related indicators: whether the importer and
exporter were ever in a colonial relationship, whether they share a common offi-
cial language, and whether they have a common currency. We also include effects
of regional trade agreements as comparisons. On average, colony, language, and
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TABLE 2
Cultural and non-cultural goods
Food and beverage Industrial goods
HS description HS description
1601 Sausages, similar meat products (Saucisse) 7007 Safety glass
1602 Other prepared/preserved meat (Jambon) 8467 Hand tools
220410 Sparkling wines (Champagne) 8427 Fork-lift trucks
220421 Other grape wines 85 Electric machy.
040640 Blue-veined cheese (‘Roquefort’) 9018 Medical instruments
040690 Other cheeses 9025 Measuring equipment
currency effects are as strong or stronger than the impact of a free trade agree-
ment.27
Canada offers a unique history and data opportunity to investigate colonial
legacies. Since the British defeated the French in 1763, the province of Quebec
has been politically severed from its colonizer. Nevertheless, French is still the
principal language, the legal system is based on the Napoleonic Code of 1804,
and most visitors perceive it to share other cultural aspects with France. The
data opportunity comes from the fact that Canadian import statistics record the
province of destination. This allows us to compare Quebec and Ontario import
patterns of detailed goods. In keeping with our focus in the previous subsection
on tastes, we first examine six types of food of which France supplies unique
varieties. Table 2 shows the harmonized system code for each of these taste-
oriented goods along with six industrial goods for which consumer tastes are not
relevant.
To avoid comparison with quite distinct American versions of the food prod-
ucts, we calculate import shares using the total value of imports from the ‘Con-
tinental 5’ as the denominator. In addition to France, this comprises Germany,
Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The 2006 Canadian Census tabulated ethnic origins
in each province. In Quebec 79% of those claiming origin in Continental 5 were
of French ancestry. However many also claim Canadian and Que´be´cois origins.
If we assume they also had French ancestry, the share rises to 92%. In Ontario
the self-declared French ancestry share is just 36%. According to our cultural
heritage hypothesis, themodernQue´be´cois should exhibit a preference forFrench
varieties.
Figure 9(a) shows that for each of the food and beverage categories, the French
share is considerably higher in Quebec than in Ontario. In the case of the four
foods, the gap is extreme. An alternative explanation, however, is that French
suppliers are preferred because they are easier to communicate with. The fact
that the figure 9(b) shows substantial French preference for industrial goods,
27 It should be noted that currency and colony effects estimated using Poisson PMLE normally are
much smaller.
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FIGURE 9 Did French colonists set modern Que´be´cois tastes?
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FIGURE 10 Post-independence trade of former colonies
shows that consumer tastes alone do not explain the francophilia of modern
Que´be´cois importers.
While the Quebec-France example is interesting, it is always possible that it is
a completely isolated case. Furthermore, because independence took place long
before official trade data were collected in a modern way, it offers no insight
about the time pattern of trade preferences when two ‘countries’ separate. Head,
Mayer, and Ries (2010) provide an extensive study of the erosion of the colonial
legacy in trade, studying the vast movement of independence that mostly took
place in the second half of the twentieth century.
Figure 10 shows that for most independence events (the ones that took place
without military conflict), trade between the colonizer and its former colony
declines steadily before flattening out after 40 years at around 35% of its initial
level. A further finding is that trade with the rest of the world does not jump
up to compensate, while trade between siblings (ex-colonies of the same empire)
also follows a regular decline. This suggests that what happens is a gradual
depreciation of some sort of trade capital that favoured trade between all parts
of the existing empires. It is also interesting to note that while hostile separations
result in much larger drops in trade immediately after independence, the two
types of independences converge to statistically indistinguishable trade levels after
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40 years. Military conflicts destroy more trade capital than amicable separation
does, but this is not a permanent effect, a finding we will revisit when we consider
trade effects of conflict more generally. Note finally that trade never comes back
to its initial level: countries that separate lose a lot of trade on a permanent basis,
even if most of those pairs still speak the same language, have many common
institutions left, often have very low official trade barriers, sometimes have the
same or pegged currency, and usually have substantial bilateral migration.
What these graphs do not show is the extent to which having lost 65% of the
initial trade level makes trade between ex-colonies and the ex-hegemon ‘normal.’
Table 1 and further evidence in Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) suggest that nearly
60 years after independence for most countries that were colonies in the 1950s,
trade with the ex-colonizer is still much larger than the gravity prediction (even
after including controls for trade policy preferences, common currency, language
and institutions). This is perhaps a consequence of the long-run persistence of
tastes that we discussed in the preceding section.
4.4. Histories of violence and contemporary trade
A last piece of evidence about the importance of historical connections be-
tween two nations for their current trade patterns is related to military conflicts.
In a sense, if we should find current effects of historical heritage, tracing the
consequences of the most traumatic violent episodes opposing two countries is
probably a good starting point. One just has to remember the importance given
to military conflicts in school textbooks to realize that people are probably aware
of this type of historical linkage from very early in life, at an age where tastes,
preferences, and opinions are still pretty much in the making.
Let us startwith ‘short-run’ effects ofwars.Martin,Mayer, andThoenig (2008)
find that conflict between two countries lowers bilateral trade by around 40% for
the first three years after initial hostilities and that trade remains significantly
below the gravity benchmark for slightly more than a decade. Glick and Taylor
(2010) find an even larger contemporary effect on a longer sample that includes
the two world wars. They also show that it takes about 10 years for trade to
return to its normal level.
Figure 11(a) illustrates the influence of war on trade, returning to an example
that Bhagwati used to cast doubt on the distance effect. Pakistan’s trade with
India and the UK is expressed as ratios over a naive gravity prediction (based
on GDP and distance). In the initial years after independence, both flows were
reasonably close to the gravity prediction. Unfortunately, the relationship be-
tween Pakistan and India featured a series of conflicts, whose intensity is shown
in the graph. The 5s (circled) correspond to actual wars, whereas the 4s are ‘use
of force.’28 We see that conflict causes trade to defy gravity. Nevertheless, gravity
appears determined to reassert itself. During the 1970s, respite from conflict,
28 The classification is carried out by political scientists and is available online in the Covariates of
War (COW) database.
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FIGURE 11 Conflict, trade, and trust
Pakistan’s exports to India surged back towards the gravity benchmark, but that
progress was halted when hostilities flared up again in the early 1980s.
Figure 11(b) (taken from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008) shows more
generally the evolution of trade before and after conflicts, averaging the effects of
all types of conflict (3 to 5 using the same COW range) between 1950 and 2000.
Apart from that contemporaneous effect of conflict on bilateral trade, do
conflicts have impacts that persist for long periods? We can think of three main
mechanisms bywhich past conflict should reduce current bilateral trade (over and
above the effect of reduced GDPs, which are controlled for in gravity regression
settings):
 destruction of bilateral physical trading infrastructure such as bridges and
railroad tracks
 destruction of social capital/networks that facilitate interactions,
 formation of persistent negative sentiment, which acts as a psychological cost
of bilateral trade with past enemies
The very long-run effects of war are of the greatest interest for this paper, since
they might account for some of the ‘dark energy’ pushing countries apart. Che
et al. (2013) examine the effects of the Japanese invasion of China inWorldWar II
on provincial trade patterns 56 years later. Controlling for province fixed effects,
they find that Chinese provinces that suffered greater casualty rates between 1937
and 1945 have lower trade with Japan in 2001. Altogether, the legacy of the war
invasion is a 5.43% annual reduction in Sino-Japanese trade. Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2009) make the most ambitious attempt to link historical conflict
to current economic exchange. They have a two-stage empirical model. In the
first stage, the authors find that a past history of frequent conflict leads to lower
levels of bilateral trust among European countries (as measured in surveys taken
recently). In the second stage, the results show that lower predicted levels of
bilateral trust cause lower levels of bilateral trade.
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We are fascinated by these findings of very long-run effects of conflict but do
not believe they are strong enough to decisively refute the Martin et al. (2008)
and Glick and Taylor (2010) finding that trade returns to normal after a decade
without hostility. First, the China results appear to be identified from a hand-
ful of provinces where the Japanese invasion inflicted heavy casualties. Hence,
they depend upon log-distance controlling for all the relevant determinants of
bilateral trade between those provinces and Japan. Second, France and Eng-
land are classified by Guiso et al. (2009) as having 198 years of war. Being 10
times the average, this observation may have undue influence in the Guiso et al.
(2009) bilateral trust regressions. If war really did have trade-destroying effects
that persist for decades, then we would expect to see a large negative residual
in France’s imports from Germany. But despite inflicting French war deaths
of 4% of its population in World War I and 1% in World War II, figure 3(b)
shows Germany (DEU) very slightly above the prediction line for France’s im-
ports. Finally, figure 10(b) shows that after 40 years conflictual separations
do not have significantly lower trade than colonial relationships that ended
peacefully.
Summing up, the short- to medium-run negative effect of hostilities on trade
is very clear. More work is needed to ascertain the very long-run effects of war
on trade.
5. Conclusion
Trade is rising faster than GDP, but the remaining ‘globalization gap’ is much
wider than the total increase in openness. Distance deters trade even more today
than it did 50 years ago. Estimated distance effects are too large, too ubiqui-
tous, and of the wrong form to be explained entirely by freight costs. National
borders impede trade less than before, but their effect remains too large to be
easily explained with conventional barriers. We have not found a simple explana-
tion for these findings. There is a range of suggestive evidence pointing towards
information-based mechanisms as well as historical legacies. One force of re-
sistance we find particularly interesting is historically determined differences in
tastes. Such differences have the potential to explain some of the large distance
and border effects that have been found for trade data. However, they differ from
other impediments to trade in that they are not so much costs of trade as they
are limitations to the gains from trade. Put another way, full removal of all trade
impediments is less attractive if consumers mainly prefer the varieties that are
already domestically available. On the other hand, informational barriers could
be removed and result in large gains.
While the main task of this paper has been to synthesize and discuss prior
research, we want to end by highlighting four novel contributions that may prove
useful in future research. First, figure 2 demonstrates a non-parametric method
of illustrating the role of distance in impeding trade. Second, figure 5 applies
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quantile regression to gravity estimation and shows that distance elasticities are
not constant across the distribution. We applied the same approach to language
effects and found larger differences, the gap widening over time. Third, we have
proposed a method of calculating border effects that takes into account multilat-
eral resistance but does not require a regression that estimates a parametric effect
of distance on resistance. Fourth, we have suggested a way to decompose distance
and border effects into a share attributable to easily measured trade costs (freight
and tariffs) and a share we attribute to dark trade costs. These hidden sources of
resistance appear to be far more important than those that we can see.
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